Wednesday, April 9, 2008

Europeans discover Pakistan Occupied Kashmir

J&K better than PoK, say Euro MPs

While Pakistan was seeking self-determination in Jammu and Kashmir, "it was not even prepared to allow democracy on its side of the border," Baronness Emma Nicholson MEP said at a two-day international conference on 'Constitutional, Political and Socio-economic conditions of Gilgit Baltistan' at the European Parliament in Brussels on Tuesday.


Baronness Emma Nicholson was on a fact finding visit to both sides of Kashmir. She had tabled a report on the "suppression of human rights" in the Northern Areas of PoK which was adopted by the European Parliament in 2007.

The pakis however went of a diplomatic charge and watered down the report.

Sardar Shaukat Ali Kashmiri seem to have got this part right. He has suffered the Paki double standards in the Pakistani Occupied kashmir. Shaukat Ali Kashmiri wanted the European Parliament to set up a fact-finding mission on the ground realities in the Gilgit and Baltistan region and other parts of the PoK.

The part Sardar Shaukat Ali Kashmiri seem to have got it wrong is independence from India. If an independent kashmir comes up, it will have 3 threats. 1) Pakis 2) Chinese Communists who nibble into everything 3) Infighting from within. They can have UN setup in Kashmir, but, isn't it already there and is it working?

Saturday, April 5, 2008

Naval assets not for war?

Premvir Das Director General Defence Planning Staff and Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Naval Command Wrote this article .

Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) (of India) came out with is own comments on the purchase of INS Jalashva. It was an revelation when it commented that "INS Jalashva cannot be used for war." Why the hell did Indian Navy buy it then? What ever the reasons, look at Premvir Das's justification.

To quote him:

The CAG goes on to object that the contract specifies that the ship should not be used in war. This provision, if it is there, is not unique. When we leased the nuclear submarine Chakra from former USSR in 1988, there was a similar clause in the contract. What we then paid as annual lease cost for that submarine compares with the total price at which Jalashva was purchased at comparable prices. The CAG is also upset that the contract specifies that the supplying country viz USA would have the right to send its people to look at the inventories etc. Once again, only the naval staff can accurately answer this question but it would be useful to remember that for the Chakra, the Soviets insisted, and we agreed, that there own crew would be physically present on the vessel all the time throughout the lease period. So, we had a Russian Commanding Officer, and his crew, present on the submarine 24/7 along with our own people.


If the clause of not going to war with INS Jalashva exists (ofcourse it was denied by US), then Indian Navy had no business buying it. INS Chakra was leased for different purpose. It was to learn how to handle a nuclear submarine. If INS Jalashva was purchased to learn how to handle a big vessel, its silly. We already had INS Viraat. Ofcourse INS Viraat cannot traing Indian navy in amphibious landings. It is still justified to buy INS Jalashva. Why should US be able to look into its inventories? But the way author puts it up is different. He further writes:

This brings us to the question of use of the vessel in war. The Jalashva, as far as those familiar with its possible exploitation can see, is essentially a platform which will enhance our capabilities for rendering assistance during natural calamities such as the Tsunami of 2004.


Indian Navy's primary job is something you know what? But buying a vessel for humanitarian assistance is streaching Navy too far. It's fine INS Jalashva can rescue people, its primary job should be war.

But there is something that Premvir Das wrote and that is a fact. CAG needs to have some training.
This brings us back to what the CAG has said. All those familiar with the process know how exactly the process works. First some lower level auditors look at the files and ask questions. These having been answered by the Headquarters, in this case the Navy, the position is further examined and fresh sets of queries raised. Very rarely will the explanations be accepted. There is little awareness or appreciation among the auditors of the professional issues involved; sometimes, the differences become acrimonious and, in turn, lead to remarks made by higher audit authorities, finally emanating as the comments of the CAG.

Audit of the financial aspect is overtaken, incorrectly, by audit of the professional issue and this is what has happened in this case. This is all the more remarkable because the present CAG is a person with considerable knowledge of the working of the defence establishment. Inhibiting the defence modernisation process is the last thing he should want.

Thursday, April 3, 2008

PV Narsimha Rao and the Bomb

No doubt that the father of Modern India is PV Narasimha Rao (PVN). One of his best kept secrets was the 1994 incident where US detected Indian test preperations for nuclear test. What happened then? PVN when interviewed said that he will carry the secret to his grave.. which he did.

Then came this report. It really helped put the pieces togther.

Nuclear Scientist Krishnan Santhanam told Times Now TV that the plans to explode the bomb at Pokhran was put on "hold" due to apparent US pressure.


PVN had denied it, he had said that it was not the US pressure but national interest was the reason. here is the other version

Bhuvnesh Chaturvedi, who was the Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office at the time of the 1994 nuke plan, told Times Now that the government was indeed planning for a nuke test, but cited domestic reasons for its deferment.

"We had the capacity to do it, but we did not do it, because the elections were near. We did not want the successive government to bear the brunt. If the government would have continued in power, we could have done it," Chaturvedi said.


Bhuvnesh Chaturvedi seems to be telling the truth. Because as per former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who ordered the nuclear tests
an emotional Vajpayee said when he assumed the Prime Minister's office in 1996 (the 13-day stint), he received a paper from his predecessor urging him to continue the country's nuclear programme.

Rao had asked me not to make it public; but today when he is dead and gone, I wish to set records straight.

In typical Vajpayee fashion, the former Prime Minister went on: Rao told me that the bomb is ready. I exploded it. I did not miss the opportunity.


Its worth quoting C. RAJA MOHAN in his article Portrait of Rao as N-architect

Rao’s mandate to his foreign secretary J.N. Dixit (1991-94) was to buy time and space for India’s bomb programme.

Together Rao and Dixit, now the national security adviser, devised a variety of diplomatic strategems to resist international pressures without confronting the US head-on and thus gained valuable time for Indian scientists to come up with a credible programme of nuclear tests, including the Hydrogen bomb.

The appointed day arrived in mid-December 1995. The nuclear devices were already put into the L-shaped hole dug for the purpose in Pokhran desert. The Ministries of External Affairs and Finance had estimated of the costs of US sanctions that would have followed. The officer in the MEA specialising in the nuclear issue had a prepared statement in his drawer justifying India’s decision.

As US satellite pictures began to show Indian preparations for the test, the New York Times broke the story about India’s plans to test on December 15. After two days, India finally declared it had no intention to test.Had Rao tested in 1995, India’s political history might have been different. With elections due in mid-1996, the nuclear card could have possibly returned Rao to power. Yet, inexplicably Rao chose not to. Some say he succumbed to US pressure. Others say he was concerned about Pakistan’s reaction and the economic consequences.

Nuclear ambivalence summed the man that Rao was — laying foundations for the transformation of India’s security, foreign and economic policies, but holding back at key moments.


A million salutes to you Mr. PV Narasimha Rao

Wednesday, April 2, 2008

welcome Sniperz11

Sniperz11 has been a friend and he has a well read blog called http://sniperz11.blogspot.com/ . He is a defence enthusiast to the core, you can read it in his blog.

He also writes very well, he has written for frontierindia.net . He has edited a lot of my stories in frontierindia.net . Its very dificult to get someone with cross descipline knowledge.

So, its only logical to invite him. Ofcourse, he accepted the invite.

I warmly welcome Sniperz11 and look forward to see his contributions.